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Do trade integration and fiscal competition contribute to shape the economic landscape?  
The answer is yes. This paper uses a theoretical model and an econometric analysis of 
Brazilian regional manufacturing employment data over the period 1990-1998 to address this 
question. Brazil is a natural case study because this country liberalized trade during the 
1990s and their sub-national governments engaged in a fiscal dispute. Econometric results 
show that trade liberalization has had an impact on spatial developments and this effect is 
increasing over time. Moreover, subsidies also exert an influence, but their relative 
importance is falling. 
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Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition 




Many developing countries have implemented important trade liberalization programs since the mid-
1980s. In addition, regional trade agreements have proliferated in recent years. 42 trade agreements 
were notified to the WTO between 1991 and 1995 and 58 between 1996 and 2000. Moreover, trade 
within these blocs accounts for a substantial fraction of world trade and virtually all WTO-countries are 
members of an agreement in the form of a free trade zone or a customs union. According to Fernández-
Arias  et al. (2001), the world has also witnessed increased competition between governments for 
attracting economic activities. The scope of this competition is global but at the same time largely intra-
regional. More fundamentally, Oman (2000) states that sub-national governments seem to play an 
important role as competitors for activities in federal countries. 
Trade integration and fiscal competition are important factors shaping a country’s internal economic 
geography because they induce changes in the relative profitability of alternative locations. However, 
existing evidence of this phenomenon is rather limited.
1  
Brazil provides an interesting natural case study for several reasons. First, the country opened its 
economy on both a unilateral basis and a preferential basis in the framework of MERCOSUR, a regional 
trade bloc formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991. Second, as reported in Goncalves 
Cavalcanti and Prado (2000), Brazilian states engaged increasingly in fiscal competition to attract 
manufacturing activities, which relates to the federal dimension of the country. Furthermore, the location 
implications of trade liberalization and fiscal disputes are relevant matters of concern for economic policy 
especially when pre-existing regional disparities are large. Indeed, these large disparities are a distinctive 
feature of the Brazilian economy.  
This paper analyzes the influence of economic integration and fiscal competition on manufacturing 
location patterns. I use a New Economic Geography model and then test the resulting hypotheses on 
                                                 
1 For example, Hanson (1998) examines the spatial implications of Mexican trade liberalization in the mid-1980s. In addition, 
although there are many studies on the influence of taxes on the geographical distribution of firms in the United States, e.g., Papke 
(1991), Hines (1996); and some recent contributions on Switzerland, e.g., Feld and Kirchgässner (2003); evidence for other 
(especially developing) federal countries is scarce.   2
Brazilian data over the period 1990-1998 following an econometric approach similar to that of Midelfart-
Knarvik et al. (2000) and Overman et al. (2000). One main question is addressed in this paper: Do 
economic integration and fiscal competition help to explain manufacturing location patterns? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework based on 
an extended version of the “Footloose Capital Model” presented in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin 
et al. (2003). Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents a descriptive examination of 
manufacturing location patterns in Brazil. Section 5 reports and discusses the results of the econometric 
analysis. The results show that industries with highly tradable products tend to locate in states which are 
nearer to Argentina. This effect seems to be increasing over the decade studied, as economic integration 
proceeds. Moreover, trade liberalization has strengthened the tendency of industries to locate in states 
with better infrastructure and has weakened demand linkages. The evidence also suggests that subsidy 
policies have an influence on location patterns. This influence is, however, declining over time. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical  Framework 
 
New Economic Geography models show that, in the presence of trade costs and increasing returns, 
initially similar regions may endogenously differentiate through a circular causation mechanism.
2 These 
models are, however, difficult to solve algebraically and hence generally require the use of simulation 
methods to obtain results. One simpler variant is the so-called “Footloose Capital Model” (FC), which has 
been developed in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2003). This model and several of its 
extensions are aimed at examining the influence of specific factors on location decisions (e.g., 
infrastructure quality, subsidies, vertical linkages, and relative factor endowments) rely usually on a two-
region setting. Since this paper focuses on the impact of trade liberalization on the internal economic 
geography of a country, a three-region framework is more appropriate and will be used to derive testable 
hypotheses. This section therefore introduces an extended FC model and highlights the role of economic 




                                                 
2  See, e.g., Krugman (1991); Venables (1996); and Fujita et al. (1999)   3




The model assumes an economy with three regions: 1 and 2, which are regions within the home 
country, and 3, a foreign country. There are two sectors: agriculture, which produces a homogenous good 
under constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive environment and whose output is costlessly 
traded, and industry, which produces differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale in a 
monopolistically competitive environment à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Industry output faces iceberg 
interregional (international) trade costs (Samuelson, 1954)  1 > τ ( 1 ≥ >τ δ ) so that firms must ship  1 > τ  
units of the industrial good in order to sell one unit in the other region of the same country and  1 > δ  units 
in the other country. There are two production factors: capital, K, which is mobile across regions and 
labor,  L, which is immobile across regions.
3 Total supplies of both factors are fixed, 
T K and
T L , 
respectively.  
The presented analysis concentrates on the location of industry. The agricultural sector is thus kept 
as simple as possible. In particular, it uses only aA units of labor to produce one unit of output. As a 
consequence, the other sector, industry, intensively uses the mobile factor, K.  
Three particular aspects related to capital are worth mentioning. First, capital owners are assumed to 
be completely immobile across regions so that even when physical capital moves, rewards are 
repatriated to the region of origin. Second, the spatial separation between physical capital and its owner 
requires to distinguish between the share of total capital owned by residents in region 1, 
T
K K K s
1 1 ≡ from 
the share of total capital employed in the region which is assumed to be equal to the region’s share of 
total industry,  T
n n n s
1 1 ≡ . Third, the cost function of industrial firms displays different factor intensities for 
fixed and variable costs. The fixed cost only involves capital whereas variable cost only involves labor. 
Formally, each industrial firm requires one unit of K and aM units of labor per unit of output. Thus, the cost 
function has the following form: 
                                                 
3 Incorporating labor mobility into the present framework would generate a model allowing for the analysis of phenomena such as 
“catastrophic agglomeration”. Nevertheless, no additional insights would be produced for this paper because this model yields 
essentially similar qualitative results and comes at the expense of a lower analytical tractability. A similar assumption is made by 
Monfort and van Ypersele (2003).    4
1 1 1 1 ) ( x a w x C M + =π   (1)
where 
1 π and 
1 w  are the rewards to capital and labor, respectively; aM is the variable unit input 
requirement; and x is the firm-level output.  
The typical consumer has a two-tier utility function with a Cobb-Douglas function determining a 
(constant) division of expenditure between the homogeneous good and the differentiated goods and a 
CES function defining tastes over industrial varieties. Formally: 
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M C and 
1
A C  are consumption of the composite of manufacturing sector varieties and consumption of 
the agricultural sector good, respectively; 
T n  is the mass of total available industrial varieties, µ is the 
expenditure share on industrial varieties, and σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two 
varieties with σ µ 〈 〈 〈 1 0 . The corresponding indirect utility function 
1 V  is given by: 
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1 E  denotes expenditure in region 1, P is the “perfect” price index, 
1
A p  is the price of the agricultural 
good;  ()
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1 1 σ where  1
j p  is the consumer price of industrial variety j in region 1.
4 Notice that 
expenditure is equal to income since the model does not consider savings. 
Physical capital looks for the highest nominal reward rather than the highest real reward because its 
income is spent in the region where the owners reside.
5 Therefore, interregional flows of capital take 
place according to:  
( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 ˆ n n n s s s − − = π π   (4)
where π is the average return to capital and
1
n s  is the share of industry located in region 1. Definitions for 
regions 2 and 3 are analogous and denoted by superscripts 2 and 3, respectively.  
As shown in Appendix A1.A using the demand functions and the price policy of firms, the following 
equilibrium expressions for
3 2 1, π π π and can be derived: 
                                                 
4 P is the perfect price index in the sense that real income defined with P measures utility.  
5 Nominal reward is the reward in terms of the numeraire, the agricultural good, and real reward is reward in terms of the composite 
industrial good.   5
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where  σ µ ≡ b , 
T E is total expenditure and 
i
E s  is the share of expenditure in region i, and  i
n s  is the share 
of region i in industry and, given the fact that each variety requires one unit of capital, the share of total 
capital employed in this region (




R is a measure of trade openness between regions within 
the same country and  R N φ δ φ
σ〈 =
− 1  is a measure of international trade openness, i.e., trade between each 
region in the home country and the foreign country. Thus,  0 = φ  if trade costs are infinite and  1 = φ if there 
are no trade costs. 
 
Equilibrium 
In the long-run, capital is mobile between regions. Therefore, this long-run equilibrium requires that 
no capital flows take place. From Equation (4), the following “locational condition” can be derived: 
3 2 1 π π π = =   (6)
The solution to this condition can take the following forms:  1 0 〈 〈
i
n s , i.e., interior outcomes where 
capital earns the same reward in all regions (as defined in Equation (5)) or  {} 1 , 0 =
i
n s , i.e., core-periphery 
outcomes where manufacturing is concentrated in one of the regions. 
In general, the share of manufacturing located in a given region is increasing in the share of 
expenditure accounted for by this region (home market effect). Clearly, industries with economies of scale 
prefer to settle in locations with larger markets since they can then avoid trade costs on a larger fraction 
of their sales. This gives rise to the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Manufacturing industries with increasing returns to scale locate in regions with larger 
market potentials.  
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.B. 
   6
Some Extensions 
What are the conditions under which the above model can generate a similar result to the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin model? Assume, as in this last model, that both factors are immobile over space. In this 
case, even though labor rewards are equalized across regions by free trade in agricultural goods, 
rewards on capital may differ due to the presence of trade costs. In particular, assuming three regions 
with identical sizes in terms of their shares in total expenditure, from Equation (5), it can be then shown 
that capital-intensive manufacturing activities tend to locate in the capital-abundant region. Thus:  
Proposition 2: Industries locate in those regions that are relatively abundant in the factors that are 
used intensively in their production processes.
6  
Economic geography also hinges upon physical geography. In particular, regions within a country 
may differ in the access provided to third markets. The influence of these asymmetric locational 
advantages can be highlighted using the extended FC model assuming that the proximity to the foreign 
country differs across regions in the home country. The location of firms is then driven by two main 
factors: a home market effect, as before, and a geographical effect. The net result depends on the 
particular size-locational advantage distribution. If the region is relatively large and occupies a “central” 
position, i.e., it provides a good access to other regions’ markets, both effects reinforce each other. 
However, if the region is relatively small, then the effects move in opposite directions. This can be 
translated into the following proposition:  
Proposition 3: Industries locate in regions with better relative access to relevant foreign markets, 
provided that their local markets are large enough. 
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.C. 
As shown in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2003), the quality of infrastructure is also 
an important factor for attracting firms as it directly affects the magnitude of transport costs. This can be 
easily incorporated into the analysis by assuming that firms face costs in both the local sales and external 
sales. Now reducing intra-regional transaction costs increases the effective size of the local market for 
local producers and, as previously seen a larger market attracts more firms. Thus, the following 
proposition can be derived: 
Proposition 4: Industries locate in regions with better domestic infrastructure.  
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.D. 
                                                 
6 The proof is available from the author upon request.
   7
Venables (1996) highlights the role of vertical linkages between activities subject to increasing 
returns to scale as an additional relevant location factor under the presence of trade costs. If imperfectly 
competitive industries are linked through an input-output structure and trade costs are positive, cost and 
demand linkages induce the agglomeration of downstream and upstream firms, i.e., firms in different 
stages of the production chain.  
Appendix A1.E shows that vertical linkages can be introduced assuming that the production of a 
typical variety entails a fixed cost of one unit of capital and a variable cost that involves labor and 
intermediate inputs: In this case, regional market sizes,
i
E s , are endogenous, since expenditure now 
includes expenditure on intermediate goods by other mobile firms. These market sizes are increasing in 
the share of population and firms located in the region. Under positive trade costs and economies of 
scale, profits increase in output and output is proportional to the composite input including intermediates. 
Although it is not possible to get a closed form solution for the location variables
i
n s , the main forces at 
work can be identified. 
There is one force favoring dispersion: the market crowding effect. An increase in the number of 
firms in a region will induce a decrease in the market share of existing firms. On the other hand, there are 
two forces pushing for spatial concentration. The first agglomeration force is the cost linkage. An increase 
in 
1
n s  implies that more varieties are produced in region 1, which reduces the production cost in this 
region and increases it in the other regions. Hence, firms prefer to be located in regions with a large 
industrial sector because required inputs are available at a lower price due to savings on trade costs. The 
second agglomeration force is the demand linkage. Under positive transport costs, firms buy a 
disproportionately large amount of intermediate goods on the domestic market. Thus, production shifting 
to region 1 in the form of an increase in 
1
n s  is associated with expenditures shifting towards this region, 
raising profits there, and reducing them in the other regions. Firms selling to a large extent to industrial 
firms prefer to locate in regions with many industrial firms since these locations ensure a good market 
access. Agglomeration forces tend to prevail as relative internal trade becomes freer. In summary: 
Proposition 5: Industries using intensively manufactured intermediate goods in the production 
process locate in regions with broad industrial bases (cost linkages).  
Proposition 6: Industries whose demand comes to a large extent from the manufacturing sector 
locate in regions with broad industrial bases (demand linkages).  
   8
2.2  Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition 
 
Economic Integration 
Economic integration affects the spread of manufacturing industries in different ways. One important 
factor for these location effects is the physical geography.
7 Reduced trade costs have different impacts 
across regions depending on how close they are to the new market opened up by trade liberalization. 
Thus, Brazil’s South Region, which is closest to Argentina, is likely to benefit more than other Brazilian 
regions from a trade agreement between both countries. In general, declining international trade costs 
tend to be associated with an inward flow of firms to the region providing an easier access to the foreign 
market as long as the region is not too small, i.e., if its locational advantage outweighs any eventual size 
disadvantage. This can be translated into the following proposition: 
Proposition 7: A reduction in external trade costs will favor those regions with better relative access 
to relevant foreign markets, provided that their local markets are large enough. 
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.F. 
Further, as established in Proposition 4, a better infrastructure fosters industry location because it 
implies lower internal trade costs and thus a larger domestic market. It can be shown that this effect of 
infrastructure on location increases with trade liberalization. Effective prices in different markets depend 
on external and internal trade costs. Reduced international trade costs imply that the relative price of 
goods produced in the region with better infrastructure falls and thus induces a higher demand for the 
goods produced there.  
Proposition 8: A reduction in external trade costs intensifies the tendency of industries to locate in 
regions with better domestic infrastructure.  
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.G. 
Venables (2001) argues that vertical linkages depend on the structure of the input-output matrix as 
well as on the tradability of the involved products. Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) state that 
economic integration, by increasing the share of inputs and outputs that may be exported and imported, 
on average tends to weaken cost and demand linkages within a country. The net result hinges upon the 
strength of inter-industry production relationships. Thus, industries with a high share of intermediate 
                                                 
7 Hanson (1998) shows that the locational shift of Mexican manufacturing sector towards regions bordering with the United States 
that took place after the opening of the economy can be explained by the better access they provide to this relevant foreign market.    9
manufactured inputs in their production will show less pronounced changes as trade is liberalized than 
those using a relatively small amount of industrial inputs. This leads to the following proposition: 




Under certain circumstances regional subsidy policies will influence location decisions by firms. 
Martin and Dupont (2003) highlight that subsidies have two kinds of effect on the spatial patterns of 
economic activities: a direct impact relating to the increased profitability of the firms located in the region 
granting the subsidy and an indirect effect through the associated changes in the spatial distribution of 
expenditures, which in turn depends on the spread of capital ownership over space and that of the taxes 
financing the subsidy. This sub-section focuses on the first-order effects of subsidies on location using a 
partial equilibrium approach.  
As expected, the first-order effect is positive, i.e., subsidies induce a re-location towards the 
conceding region because they increase the relative profitability of being settled in that region. Given the 
presence of trade costs, this relocation effect is generally increasing in the region’s market size. The 
following proposition is thus derived:  
Proposition 10: Industries with increasing returns to scale locate in regions ensuring more favorable 
fiscal conditions. This effect is more pronounced if these regions also have large home markets.  
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.H. 
The traditional tax competition literature shows that other regions may react to this policy by also 
offering subsidies. A so-called race to the bottom thus develops. Wilson (1999) contends that regions 
symmetric in size will end up conceding a tax break of the same size and the spatial equilibrium will be 
unaffected. Similarly, one could think that smaller regions provide larger subsidies to compensate for their 
size disadvantage or that larger regions concede tax breaks that, given their dimensional advantage, just 
compensate the fiscal actions by smaller regions. This is stated in the following proposition:  
Proposition 11: Interregional tax competition will result in regions providing inversely proportional 
subsidies with no impact on location patterns of economic activities.  
The proof is provided in Appendix A1.I.   10
3 Data 
 
The basic unit of analysis in the empirical examination is the activity level of an industry as measured 
by employment at the state level. Employment data come from RAIS (Annual Social Information Report) 
and is for the period from 1990 to 1998. This database is prepared by the Brazilian Ministry of Works and 
reports employment in the 21 manufacturing industries identified in the IBGE (Brazilian Statistical Bureau) 
classification for each of the 27 states in the Brazilian Federation.
8 One important aspect of that data set 
is that RAIS is an administrative report filed by all tax registered Brazilian establishments. The information 
contained in this database is used to control labor legislation compliance so that firms who do not observe 
the law do not therefore appear in RAIS. Hence, RAIS may be seen as a census of formal Brazilian 
employment.
9 Because of this, the use of these employment data to study location issues is essentially 
correct if the informality ratio is similar across geographical units and across industries. In the case of 
Brazil Andrade and Serra (1998) have shown that the differences in the degree of informality among the 
most important metropolises is not high.
10 
The dataset RAIS is then combined with production statistics from the System of National Accounts 
published by IBGE, which provide a proper characterization of industries in terms of factor intensities, 
cost structures, and sales orientation; and with regional data from the IBGE, the IPEA (Institute of Applied 
Economic Research), the GEIPOT (Brazilian Firm of Transport Planning), the DNER (National 
Department of Routes), and the CNI (National Confederation of Industries), which provide a suitable 
characterization of states in terms of their factor endowments, market sizes, and fiscal policies. Table 
A2.A in Appendix A2 provides a detailed description of the variables, their definitions, the time period for 
which information is available, and the sources. 
 
                                                 
8 Brazil has no disaggregate data on manufacturing production at state level since the industrial census of 1985. There are only 
some estimates of these values for some regions and some specific states.  
9 FIPE-USP (2001) compares RAIS with the broader household survey PNADS carried out by the IBGE. Both are very close. 
10 The informality rate in Brazilian main metropolitan regions ranged from 20.15% in Porto Alegre to 26.74% in Recife in 1995.   11
4   Descriptive Evidence  
 
The theoretical results obtained in Subsection 2.2 suggest that economic integration and fiscal 
policies have a significant impact on location patterns of industrial activities. This section characterizes 
these location patterns in Brazil, reports information on key explanatory variables, i.e., external trade 
costs, distance to Argentina, and regional subsidy policies, and finally presents descriptive evidence of 
the influence of these factors on the spread of manufacturing activities across Brazilian states and thus a 
preliminary empirical assessment of the theoretical propositions derived in Subsection 2.2. 
 
4.1   Location Patterns 
 
Table 1 reports the share of each Brazilian state in total national manufacturing employment.
11 The 
data suggest there have been noticeable changes in the spatial pattern of employment. First, the 
employment share of Brazil’s traditional industrial region, the Southeast Region, has declined 
significantly. This region has lost more than 5 percentage points between 1990-1992 and 1996-1998. In 
contrast, the Southern Region’s employment share has increased. This rise represents almost 60% of the 
fall in the share of the former region. The Mid-West Region accounts for another 30% of the drop in the 
Southeast Region’s share. With respect to the initial share, this last region registered an impressive 
expansion (75%). 
Second, employment changes have not been uniform across states within the same region. Thus, 
the decline in the share of the Southeast Region has mainly reflected developments in two states, Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Minas Gerais, in turn, has increased its share and has displaced Rio de Janeiro 
as the third industrial state by overall manufacturing employment. On the other hand, the increase in the 
South Region’s employment share is concentrated in Paraná and Santa Catarina.  
Finally, the performance of Rondonia stands out in the Northern Region. This state has doubled its 
employment share and has accounted for almost half of the slight increase in the regional share over the 
period. Ceará and Pernambuco in the Northeast Region show opposite trends in their employment shares 
increasing in the first case and decreasing in the second case. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Figure A3.A in Appendix A3 presents a political map of Brazil.   12
4.2  Economic Integration and State Locational Advantages 
 
Brazil has actively engaged in unilateral and regional trade liberalization over the 1990s. Non-tariff 
barriers were relaxed in 1990. In particular, the list of forbidden imports was abolished and quantitative 
restrictions covering 39% of tariff lines were virtually removed.
12 At the beginning of 1991, the country 
also launched a program of tariff reduction. As a result, the range of tariff rates went from 0%-105% to 
0%-40% by July 1993. The simple average tariff fell from 50.6% in 1988 to 14.2% in 1993, and the 
dispersion of tariff levels reduced from 26.2 to 9.5 over the same period. Brazil also established 
MERCOSUR together with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991. Trade was gradually liberalized 
among member countries of this regional trade agreement over the period 1991 to 1995 for most 
products. In fact, Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) show that intra-MERCOSUR trade was almost free by 
1996. In addition, a Common External Tariff averaging 11% was applied in 1995.  
As a result of the traditional gravitational forces and the tariff preferential margins, trade liberalization 
has increased the relative importance of neighboring markets, especially that of Argentina, the second 
largest country in the Southern Cone. Thus Argentina’s share of Brazilian exports increased from 2.1% in 
1990 to 13.2% in 1998. Similarly, Argentina’s share of Brazilian imports rose from 6.7% to 13.8% over the 
same period.
13 However, these developments are not uniform over space. As suggested by trade data, 
there are significant differences across states. Traditional industrial states in the South and the Southeast 
Region, which are closer to Argentina, have accounted for more than 90% of total exports to Argentina 
over the period 1990-1998.
14 
Distance is, according to gravity models, a relevant explanatory factor of trade flows between 
regions. In particular, the intensity of trade linkages declines with the distance between trading regions. 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the distance to relevant Argentine markets, mainly Buenos Aires and its 
surrounding region differs substantially across Brazilian states. 
As stated in Propositions 3 and 7 derived from the theoretical model presented above, these 
locational advantages in terms of market access provided by the different regions have an impact on the 
spatial distribution of production activities. 
                                                 
12 See Estevadeordal, Goto, and Saez, (2000) for details. 
13  The data come from the United Nation’s Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.  
14 The data has been provided by the FUNCEX (Brazil’s Foundation for International Trade).   13
4.3 State  Subsidies 
 
Brazil is a federal country with three levels of government: the federal government, 26 states and one 
Federal District, and more than 5,500 municipalities. The most important tax assigned to the states is the 
tax on the flows of goods and services (ICMS). According to Varsano (1999), this value-added tax (VAT) 
accounts roughly for about 25% of the total tax burden and represents 7% of Brazil’s GDP. The ICMS is 
regulated according to a restricted origin principle. The magnitude of state revenues is thus an increasing 
function of the production taking place in its territory. Furthermore, each state can negotiate with firms the 
tax conditions. The absence of an effective institutional enforcement mechanism of horizontal tax 
coordination resulted in intense fiscal competition by Brazilian states to attract economic activities. This is 
reflected by the fact that all states implemented subsidy policies during the 1990s. This makes Brazil a 
particularly interesting case to assess theoretical Propositions 10 and 11 as discussed in Section 2. 
The states in the Northeast Region such as Ceará, Piauí, Pernambuco, and Alagoas have in fact 
benefited firms through large reductions in the ICMS to be collected over relatively long periods. The state 
which has provided the most favorable financial conditions also belongs to this region (Bahia in 1995 and 
Alagoas in 1998). From 1995 to 1998, the number of states who conceded incentives relating to ICMS 
grew from 18 to 22. Furthermore, the average reduction in the amount of this tax to be collected rose from 
68.08% to 71.85% and the coefficient of variation of the tax breaks declined from 0.25 to 0.23. Moreover, 
the average number of years over which fiscal benefits were extended increased from 7.91 to 10.00. In 
summary, there is clear evidence of an intensified fiscal competition. 
Tax breaks have not been the only competitive instrument used. Brazilian states have resorted to 
diverse mechanisms, including direct financial support and donation of properties. Additionally, the 
conditions under which specific incentives have been conceded have differed across states. These 
conditions can be defined in terms of the credit limits, the time period, the interest rate charged, and the 
rate of monetary correction.  
Therefore, information on the diversity of the instruments used and on the conditions on granted 
subsidies are combined into an index of “state aggressiveness” in stimulating the location of economic 
activities. Figure 2 reports this index for 1995 and 1998. 
States pursuing more active subsidy policies mainly concentrate in Brazil’s Northeast Region and 
include Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Bahía. Goiás, which belongs to the Mid-West Region, has 
also used a broad range of instruments and granted generous subsidies.    14
In general, the average fiscal aggressiveness indicator has increased from 1995 to 1998. This can be 
mainly explained by the reaction of states in other Brazilian regions. States such as Pará, Amapá, and 
Tocantins in the less developed Northern Region as well as states such as Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, 
and Rio de Janeiro in the traditionally industrial Southeast Region, have followed more aggressive 
policies to attract firms. 
 
4.4  State Characteristic Bias of Industries 
 
Do industries facing lower barriers to foreign trade tend to locate in states which are nearer to 
Argentina and/or in states with better infrastructure as suggested by Propositions 7 and 8? Do industries 
with increasing returns or higher total tax burdens tend to settle in states proving more favorable fiscal 
conditions as stated in Proposition 10? One way to provide a preliminary answer to these questions 
consists of using an index of State Characteristic Bias of Industries (SCB) developed by Midelfart-Knarvik 
et al. (2000). This index results from averaging the characteristics of the states in which an industry is 
located and weighting each state characteristic by the share of the state in Brazil’s manufacturing 
employment in this sector. Formally: 
∑ ≡
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is the employment level of industry j in state i at time t expressed as a share of Brazil’s total employment 
in this industry.  i ϖ  denotes a characteristic of state i: distance to Buenos Aires, infrastructure, or 
“aggressiveness” in fiscal policy for attracting activities; and  0 t refers to the initial year and, of course, 
applies only to the latter two state characteristics. The sample contains 21 manufacturing industries. To 
simplify the presentation, for each state characteristic, industries are classified according to the respective 
average score over the period 1990-1998 in a relevant characteristic into three categories: H (high), M 
(medium), and L (low). The industry characteristics considered are: tradability, tax intensity, and 
economies of scale. Specifically, the resulting pairings are: distance to Buenos Aires-tradability, 
infrastructure-tradability, fiscal aggressiveness-tax intensity, and fiscal aggressiveness-economies of 
scale.   15
Figure 3 shows the bias indicators. This figure has been constructed such that the vertical axis 
reports the state characteristic bias of industries and the horizontal axis shows time. In all cases, I use a 
simple two-year moving average. 
Industries with highly tradable products exhibit a bias towards locations which are nearer to Buenos 
Aires. It is noteworthy that while industries whose products score highest in tradability remain roughly 
constant with respect to the distance to Buenos Aires, industries with intermediate tradability have been 
drawn closer to Argentine markets. Furthermore, industries that are tax intensive and present increasing 
returns to scale locate in states with aggressive fiscal policies, as measured by the indicator of generosity 
in granted subsidies. However, both correspondences show a declining trend. Finally, there is no clear 
pattern for infrastructure.  
 
5 Econometric  Analysis 
 
The previous section has presented some preliminary evidence on possible explanations of observed 
geographical patterns of manufacturing activity. In particular, I have associated the spatial distribution of 
sectors with selected industry and state characteristics, but in such a way I have considered only one pair 
at a time. However, actual location is the result of multiple interactions between industry and state 
characteristics. Industries and states do not differ in only one feature; their differences are multi-
dimensional. Industries have distinct intermediate input structures, different biases in the main destination 
of their sales, are subject to increasing returns to scale of varying degree, and face different external 
trade costs. Similarly, states differ in their industrial base, the access they provide to important markets, 
their abundance of agricultural products and the skill level of their population, and the fiscal policies they 
implement. The spatial distribution of industries cannot thus be attributed to only one of those 
characteristics, but to a set of them and their interactions. The relevant question is: do economic 
integration and fiscal competition among states help us understand the geographical configuration of 
Brazilian manufacturing sector? This section presents an econometric analysis addressing this question. 
First, the central hypotheses are described. Second, the specification is defined. Third, the main results 
are reported and their robustness is discussed. 
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5.1   Hypotheses 
 
Location patterns in Brazil are described by the distribution of state shares in the national 
employment level for each industry,  ij s as defined in Equation (8). The approach followed in this paper to 
explain these location patterns has been used by Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 
(2000), and Overman et al. (2000). The main idea is that industries that use intensively a given “factor” 
tend to locate in states that are relatively abundant in this “factor”.
15 Hence, if states differ in their 
endowments of educated population, industries which use intensively well educated workers will be 
drawn to states with relatively high shares of these workers. Operatively, this suggests explaining the 
location patterns through a set of interactions resulting from a specific pairing of industry characteristics 
and state characteristics. The particular correspondence of these characteristics is defined according to 
Propositions 1 to 11 derived from the theoretical model presented in Section 2. The resulting hypotheses 
will be considered next in detail. 
Table 2 presents the state characteristics, the industry characteristics, and the interactions used in 
the econometric exercises. Key interactions for the time pooling regressions are marked as bold. This 
table also specifies the dimensions on which variables change. 
The first seven interaction variables aim at controlling for the contribution of comparative advantage 
considerations and the interplay between trade costs, scale economies, and input-output linkages, as 
highlighted in the theoretical model.  
Hypothesis 1: Industries using agriculture inputs intensively locate in states in which agriculture 
accounts for an important share of total production. 
Hypothesis 2: Industries with relatively high use of labor in the production process locate in states 
with relatively low average manufacturing wage.
16 
Hypothesis 3: Industries using a skilled workforce intensively are drawn to states which are relatively 
well endowed with skilled labor. 
Hypothesis 4: Industries with increasing returns to scale locate in states with large market potentials.  
Hypothesis 5: Industries which devote a relatively high share of their total sales to final consumption 
by households locate in states providing a better access to high shares of population. 
                                                 
15 Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) also use similar interactions to explain location patterns in Europe. 
16 In this case, the expected sign of the estimated coefficient is negative. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) include this interaction among 
the explanatory factors of location patterns in the United States.    17
Hypothesis 6: Industries which heavily rely on manufactured intermediate inputs locate in states 
ensuring a better access to a large industrial base and thus to their relevant providers.
17  
Hypothesis 7: Industries in which the manufacturing sector itself is an important user find it 
advantageous to locate in states providing better access to a large industrial base and  hence to a 
significant demand source.  
Hypotheses 8-12 aim to assess the role of economic integration and fiscal competition in shaping 
manufacturing location patterns. As shown in the theoretical model above, reduced trade costs (i.e., 
increased tradability) induce firms to locate in regions with a better infrastructure, since this implies a 
lower effective price for the purchaser and therefore a higher relative demand for goods produced in such 
territories.
18 This translates into the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: Industries facing lower trade barriers to foreign trade (and who therefore trade more) 
locate in states with a better infrastructure. 
Diminutions in international trade costs imply a change in the conditions of access to other markets 
and their greater influence subsequently alters the balance of forces determining the predominant 
location pattern. Trade liberalization and the establishment of MERCOSUR thus actually expanded the 
set of markets that Brazilian firms could serve. This can then promote a spatial shifting of Brazil’s 
manufacturing sector aimed at improving access to the new customers. In other words, as stated in 
Proposition 7, industries will be drawn into states with increasing locational advantages. There is 
therefore an incentive for Brazilian firms to relocate their activities southwards, even more when Brazil’s 
Southern Region has an important own market and offers a good access to other large markets because 
it occupies a “central position”. The Southern Region lies between the traditional industrial region in 
Brazil, the Southeast Region, and the most important Argentine economic centers at the Pampeana 
Region. The interaction term between tradability (as an inverse measure of trade impediments to foreign 
                                                 
17 Black and Henderson (1999) find that in United States capital goods plants agglomerate in locations with high manufacturing 
employment, which is considered by the authors as a supporting evidence for the role of inter-industry linkages.  
18 Infrastructure, which is measured as the density of total paved roads in each state, cannot be viewed as an indicator of fiscal 
policies by Brazilian states, due to the significant differences across them with respect to the share of total roads that effectively are 
state roads. On the other hand, external trade costs are essentially determined by tariffs so that there is a priori no concern in 
disentangling cause and effect implied by this interaction.    18
trade) and the distance to Buenos Aires tries to capture this relocation effect
19. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9: Industries facing lower external trade costs (and who therefore trade more) locate in 
states situated nearer to Buenos Aires. 
The remaining variables are included in order to evaluate the influence of fiscal policies on the actual 
location patterns of industries. The indicator of generosity in granted subsidies, which reflects the fiscal 
conditions in each state, is interacted alternatively with different variables. The logic of comparative 
advantage leads to the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 10: Industries subject to relatively high taxes prefer to locate in states providing more 
favorable (and compensating) fiscal conditions. 
According to the theoretical model presented in Section 2, the impact of subsidy policies on location 
depends on the size of the market in the region implementing these policies. In particular, the attraction of 
economic activities induced by the subsidies will increase, the larger the market potential of the granting 
state. This is stated in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 11: Industries subject to relatively high taxes prefer to locate in states providing more 
favorable (and compensating) fiscal conditions especially if they have large market potentials. 
Moreover, as stated in Proposition 10, the influence of fiscal measures on the spatial distribution of 
industries is especially important for activities with increasing returns to scale for which indivisibilities are 
a major issue. Furthermore, subsidies are usually concentrated in large projects both because of their 
alleged higher multiplicative effects and their greater political impact. Scale economies are thus a natural 
candidate to capture this size effect. This argument is translated into the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 12: Industries with increasing returns to scale locate in states which provide more 
favorable fiscal conditions. 
Finally, recall that, as suggested by Proposition 11 derived in Section 2, regions can end up granting 
proportionally-sized subsidies so that fiscal measures implemented by regions compensate and location 
is unaffected in equilibrium.  
                                                 
19 I have chosen Argentina as a relevant foreign market on the basis of the relative size distribution within MERCOSUR. According 
to data from the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Paraguay and Uruguay jointly account for only 
3% of aggregate GDP. In addition, economic activity is highly concentrated within Argentina. Data from the CFI (Argentina’s Federal 
Investment Council) suggest that the province of Buenos Aires and their neighboring provinces account for almost 70% of national 
GDP over the 1990s. In this case a negative sign on the estimated coefficient should be expected.   19
5.2 Specification 
 
The dependent variable is the share of a state in Brazil’s manufacturing employment in each 
industry, 
ij s as defined in Equation (8). This ratio can only take values within [0,1] so that the dependent 
variable is truncated. As a consequence, OLS estimations will be biased. Therefore, I perform a logistic 
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where z indexes the interactions;  ) (z i ϖ is the level of the zth characteristic in state i and  ) (z j θ is the 
industry j value of the industry characteristic paired with the state characteristic. The upper bar denotes a 
reference value. 
The coefficients to be estimated are the ) (z β , which measure the importance of the interaction; 
) ( ) ( z z θ β −  and  ) ( ) ( z zϖ β − , which amount to level effects in the interaction; and a constant α , which contains 
the sum (over z) of the products of all level effects. 
The intuition behind the selected functional form is exhaustively explained in Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 
(2000). Consider, e.g., skill so that z=skill,  ) (skill i ϖ is the abundance of skilled workers in state i and 
) (skill j θ  is the skill intensity of industry j. In this case, Expression (9) means that if 0 ) ( 〉 skill β , then 
industries with skill intensity greater than  ) (skill θ locate in states with skill abundance greater than 
) (skill ϖ and out of states whose skill abundance is lower than this level. 
Equation (9) is first estimated by OLS, pooling across industries, and across years, considering 20 
industries, 27 states, and 9 years (1990 to 1998).
20 Therefore, the sample contains 4,860 observations. 
Furthermore, I condition the data on the standard deviation of the underlying variables in order to make 
comparison across variables more appropriate so that standardized coefficients will be presented. Finally, 
there are three main sources of heteroscedasticity, across states, across industries, and across time.
21 
Hence, I report White’s heteroscedastic consistent standard errors and use these standard errors for 
hypothesis testing. 
                                                 
20 The industry “Other products“, which is a residual component, has been dropped out.  




Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms with the respective 
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
22 Industries that use labor and skilled workers intensively 
tend to locate in states with relatively low average manufacturing wages and with a well educated labor 
force, respectively. These results confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3. Moreover, industries with increasing 
returns to scale are mainly located in central places. Cost and demand linkages are also important in 
explaining location patterns. Industries with high final demand bias and high intermediate demand bias 
are located close to their customers while industries which depend heavily on industrial intermediate 
inputs are located close to their providers. Hypotheses 4 to 7 are therefore also confirmed. 
The coefficient on the interaction between agriculture abundance and agriculture intensity is 
insignificant but shows a sign that does not coincide with what we would expect from the theory. A 
possible explanation relates to transport costs. The location of industries which use intensively agriculture 
inputs is determined by the availability of inputs and the closeness to customers. Indeed, most of these 
industries exhibit a medium/high bias to final demand. In addition, agriculture abundant states do not 
generally have large population potential. These industries may thus find it more profitable to let transport 
costs fall on input transfers than on reaching purchasers and thus settle closer to consumer markets than 
to their input sources.
23 
The interaction between infrastructure and tradability has the right sign, but seems to be insignificant. 
This might be due to the pooling of years with different average degrees of trade liberalness. This point 
will be addressed below. However, the remaining rows of Table 3 suggest accepting Hypotheses 9 to 12 
and thus provide a clear positive answer to the original question motivating this research. Economic 
integration and fiscal competition do help to explain manufacturing location patterns.  
As expected, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between distance and tradability is negative 
and significant. Therefore, industries with highly tradable products and thus facing lower barriers to 
foreign trade tend to locate in Brazilian states which are closer to Argentina because they provide a better 
                                                 
22 Tables including estimated coefficients on state and industry characteristics are available from the author upon request. 
23 Amiti (2001) assumes vertically linked industries with different factor intensities and shows that firms may locate in regions where 
standard trade models would suggest they would not locate. Thus, labor-intensive downstream firms may locate in a capital 
abundant region in order to be close to the intermediate input suppliers. Mutatis mutandis, a similar argument applies here.   21
access to this market. More specifically, states in the South Region, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio 
Grande do Sul, profit specially from liberalized trade. 
In addition, the estimated coefficients on the interactions involving the subsidy policies are positive 
and significant. This suggests that industries facing higher tax burdens and exhibiting increasing returns 
to scale tend to locate in states that are more generous in the fiscal incentives they grant. As previously 
stated, the effectiveness of fiscal policies for inducing location of economic activities is not uniform across 
state sizes. More precisely, states with larger market potentials are in a better position to undertake a 
fiscal dispute. To take this possibility into account I have scaled the fiscal policy variable by multiplying 
this variable with the market potential index. Regression results using this interaction term confirm the 
theoretical priors. The influence of the subsidies on location patterns is higher the larger the market 
potential of the conceding state. Nevertheless, overall results indicate that subsidies are only one element 






A certain industry or state might experience a shock to its share in national manufacturing 
employment. Overman et al. (2000) suggest using a double relative measure that ameliorates the 
incidence of shocks correlated across states and/or industries so that the state employment shares are 
normalized through state and industry sizes. The main message from the results using this re-formulated 
dependent variable remains the same.  
Taking natural logarithms raises a problem for observations which are equal to zero, since the 
logarithm does not exist for them. In this case, zero observations do not seem to be quantitatively 
important (roughly 6% of the whole sample). Nevertheless, these observations might convey important 
information. For example, shares could be systematically zero for industries with high increasing returns 
to scale in states with very low market potentials. Therefore, before performing the previous estimations, 
following Wang and Winters (1991) and Kume and Piani (2000) I replaced zero employment shares by 
small values. More precisely, I substituted the half of the minimum value of the dependent variable for 
zero values. In order to check the robustness of these original results, I performed Tobit regressions and 
                                                 
24 Most results from estimations aimed at checking for robustness are not reported to save space. They are available from the 
author upon request.    22
estimated sample selection models. I controlled also for influential observations using the estimator 
developed by Welsch (1980). Main estimation results are the same as before. 
One non-minor point in this econometric analysis is the sample size. Large sample sizes the use of 
classical t-value for hypothesis testing purposes inappropriate. As indicated in Greene (1997), the use of 
consistent estimators causes the rejection of almost any hypothesis if the sample size is large enough. 
However, most coefficients remain significant under the stronger criterion defined by the sample size-
adjusted t-value proposed by Leamer (1978). 
Furthermore, state endowments and industry intensities might be systematically subject to 
measurement errors for one particular state or industry. These errors would then translate into fixed 
effects for the state or industry in question. Hsiao (1986) contends that, by using information on both the 
inter-temporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being examined, panel data allows for a better 
control of the effects of missing, unobserved, or mismeasured variables. Therefore, I preformed Least 
Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimations. In this case, the error term varies across industries, states, 
and years so that I used a three-way-error component model. Again results are similar to those previously 
reported. 
Another major concern is raised by the fact that state’s endowments may be endogenous to location 
decisions by firms. Thus, firms belonging to an industry which intensively uses skilled workers may locate 
in a certain state due to the relative abundance of this factor. However, it is also possible that the setting 
of these firms generates an inflow of well educated workers to the state. In this case, endowments would 
be endogenous and resulting estimations would be inconsistent. Therefore, I carried out two verification 
exercises. First, I performed 2SLS regressions instrumenting explanatory variables by the respective 1-, 
2-, and 3-lagged values and I calculated the Hausman test statistics. Second, I re-estimated the original 
regressions using only the initial values (i.e., the scores of 1990) of the variables for 1990-1998, 1991-
1998, 1992-1998, and 1993-1998. The same result pattern emerges. The Hausman test statistics 
indicates that the null hypothesis of non contemporaneous correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the error term cannot be rejected. Specifically, according to the overall evidence, results obtained 
with contemporaneous values of right-hand-side variables do not significantly differ from those when 
lagged-values are used. In this sense, endogeneity seems to be a less severe problem. 
Moreover, the previous estimations assume a relatively simple error term. Given the panel nature of 
the data, a specific pattern of disturbances associated with groups of observations may be presumed. 
Baltagi (1995) has shown that ignoring groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross sectional correlation, and/or   23
serial correlation when present, result in consistent but inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients 
and biased standard errors. The modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
suggests that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across panels should be rejected. In addition, the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test indicates that the null hypothesis of independence of errors across panels should 
be also rejected. Finally, the Baltagi-Li LM test for first order serial correlation in a fixed effects model 
suggest that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be rejected, too.  
I accordingly implemented an alternative econometric strategy. I removed autocorrelation from the 
data using the Prais-Winsten transformation as indicated in Greene (1997) and used panel-corrected-
standard errors to account for groupwise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across 
panels as suggested by Beck and Katz (1996).  
Results obtained using this estimation method are reported in Table 4. The interactions between 
market potential and economies of scale, industrial base and industrial intermediate consumption, 
distance to Buenos Aires and tradability, and subsidies and economies of scale have the right sign and 
are significant at conventional levels.  
A similar message comes out from GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). These results are presented in Table 5. Note that now the interaction between tax 
intensity and fiscal generosity becomes significant. After these multiple robustness checks, the main 
conclusion remains true: both economic integration and fiscal competition have had a significant impact 
on manufacturing location patterns. 
 
5.5  Increased Economic Integration and Time Stability 
 
The original estimations have pooled across the 9 years of the sample. This implies assuming that 
the parameters of Equation (9) are stable across time. Propositions 7 to 9 derived from the theoretical 
model developed in Section 2 suggest that the underlying system may have changed as a consequence 
of the broad unilateral trade liberalization program implemented by Brazil as well as the establishment of 
MERCOSUR. The sensitivity of location decisions to state and industry characteristics has likely varied 
over the period under examination. Indeed, the Wald test statistics shows that the parameters are not 
stable over the decade. In particular, estimated coefficients are significantly different across two 
MERCOSUR sub-periods: the so-called transition period (1990-1994) and the customs union period   24
(1995-1998). I thus performed separate regressions for each sub-period. Table 6 reports estimation 
results 
The (absolute) increase observed in the estimated coefficient on the interaction between average 
manufacturing wage and labor intensity suggests a strengthening of the tendency of industries to look for 
places providing relatively better cost conditions. The firms may be thus in a better position to face the 
increased external competition induced by the opening of the economy as well as being better placed in 
their ability to export to third markets.  
The estimated coefficient on the interaction between market potential and scale economies has 
decreased. This might be also related to deepened economic integration. The simultaneous opening of 
economies that has taken place in South America may have implied a redefinition of relevant market 
potentials by increasing the weight of foreign markets. In order to test for this hypothesis, I dropped the 
interaction between distance to Buenos Aires and tradability, which accounts for the location influence of 
Argentina’s market, and I re-estimated the basic regression. The estimated coefficient on the interaction 
between market potential and economies of scale is larger than before. This precisely amounts to the 
plausibility of the explanation previously advanced. 
The increase of the estimated coefficient on the interactions between infrastructure and tradability 
and the decline of the coefficients between final demand bias and domestic population market potential 
and intermediate demand and domestic industrial market potential also seem to confirm the growing 
importance of external markets in determining location patterns of firms. Reciprocal trade liberalization in 
South America has implied that a higher share of production is being exported. Thus, industries facing 
lower trade barriers tend to relocate to states offering an appropriate infrastructure since they can serve 
the enlarged market in more favorable conditions. As seen in Section 2, better infrastructure means lower 
effective prices and higher demand for the products. In addition, the increased weight of exports in total 
demand weakens the home demand linkages, i.e., the tendency of industries to settle in states with large 
population and industrial market potentials within the country with the purpose of reaching a large number 
of customers without incurring transports costs.  
The strength of the cost linkages as measured by the interaction between industrial market potential 
and the intensity of the use of manufactured inputs is, contrary to Proposition 9 derived in Section 2, 
increasing over the decade. This suggests that Brazilian manufacturing sector still heavily relies on locally 
produced industrial inputs. The relative industrial size of Brazil within MERCOSUR together with the fact   25
that intermediate industrial consumption seems to be more intense than demand linkages, and the tariff 
structure with varying degrees of protection may play a role in explaining this result. 
More interestingly, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between distance to Argentine markets 
and tradability has increased over time (in absolute value). This is consistent with the theoretical results 
presented in Section 2. Locational advantages have become relatively more important as economic 
integration proceeds. As a consequence, Brazilian states which provide a better access to the new 
relevant markets, such as those of Argentina, have experienced increasing locational share gains over 
the decade.  
The interactions between the fiscal policy indicator and tax intensity seem to be insignificant in both 
sub-periods. However, the interaction between the subsidy indicator and scale economies and this fiscal 
indicator scaled by state market potential and tax intensity clearly have a declining trend. This suggests 
that fiscal instruments are becoming increasingly ineffective due to their relative generalization, i.e., a 
race to the bottom has developed  and consequently these instruments have lost their differentiating 
power across states attempting to influence the location decisions of firms, as would be the case in an 
equilibrium scenario of tax competition.  
 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
 
Do economic integration and fiscal competition help to explain location patterns? This paper has 
attempted to answer this question, both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical model is a variant of 
the Footloose Capital Model developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2003). The 
econometric analysis uses a methodological approach similar to that of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) and 
Overman  et al. (2000). This empirical analysis is based on the Brazilian experience. The reason to 
choose this country is twofold. Brazil has liberalized trade over the 1990s on a unilateral basis and in the 
context of regional trade agreement, MERCOSUR. In addition, Brazil witnessed an intensification of the 
fiscal dispute among states seeking to attract manufacturing activities.  
The answer to the above question is yes. The theoretical model shows that economic integration has 
a significant impact on economic geography and that, among other things, this impact is mediated by the 
physical geography, i.e., the distribution of locational advantages in terms of market access over space. 
Subsidy policies also contribute to shape the spread of manufacturing industry, but only before these 
policy instruments become generally used.    26
Econometric results suggest that industries with highly tradable products locate in those states closer 
to Argentina who offer a better access to this market and that this tendency has accentuated over time. 
The increased relative importance of foreign markets induced by trade liberalization has been also 
associated with a weakening of home demand linkages, i.e., both between domestic firms and between 
these firms and domestic consumers as well as with a strengthening of the propensity of firms to locate in 
those states with better infrastructure.  
In addition, industries with increasing returns to scale have been shown to locate in those states that 
have more generous fiscal incentives. Moreover, industries facing relatively high tax burdens tend to be 
drawn into states providing more favorable fiscal treatment especially when these states have relatively 
large market potentials. Nevertheless, subsidies are only one element in a broader set of factors 
determining location decisions, in which regional fundamentals  do play a decisive role. These fiscal 
instruments are becoming increasingly ineffective due to the relative generalization of their use, as is 
































1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 Variation Variation
(I) (II) (III) (II)/(I) (III)/(I)
AC Acre 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01
AM Amazonas 1.08 0.99 1.15 -0.09 0.07
PA Pará 0.97 1.03 1.07 0.06 0.10
RO Rondonia 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.06 0.18
AP Amapá 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
RR Roraima 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
TO Tocantins 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.04
2.33 2.37 2.74 0.04 0.41
MA Maranhao 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.01 0.06
PI Piauí 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.04 0.09
CE Ceará 1.83 2.00 2.46 0.17 0.64
RN Rio Grande do Norte 0.69 0.62 0.76 -0.07 0.07
PB Paraíba 0.76 0.71 0.89 -0.06 0.13
PE Pernambuco 3.77 2.94 2.91 -0.83 -0.86
AL Alagoas 1.12 1.12 1.32 0.00 0.20
SE Sergipe 0.46 0.39 0.40 -0.07 -0.06
BA Bahía 1.85 1.79 1.83 -0.06 -0.02
11.10 10.23 11.36 -0.87 0.25
MG Minas Gerais 8.17 9.04 9.98 0.87 1.80
ES Espirito Santo 1.13 1.19 1.34 0.06 0.21
RJ Rio de Janeiro 9.12 8.14 7.26 -0.99 -1.86
SP Sao Paulo 45.53 43.76 40.19 -1.78 -5.35
63.96 62.12 58.76 -1.84 -5.19
PR Paraná 5.16 5.89 6.75 0.72 1.59
SC Santa Catarina 5.82 6.63 6.88 0.81 1.05
RS Rio Grande do Sul 9.62 10.17 9.99 0.55 0.37
20.60 22.69 23.62 2.09 3.02
MT Mato Grosso 0.45 0.64 0.94 0.19 0.48
MS Mato Grosso do Sul 0.33 0.43 0.56 0.09 0.22
GO Goiás 0.97 1.22 1.64 0.25 0.67
DF Distrito Federal 0.25 0.31 0.39 0.06 0.14
2.01 2.60 3.52 0.58 1.51
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        Source: Own calculations on Piancastelli and Perobelli (1996) and CNI (1998) 





























AC PA AP TO PI RN PE SE MG RJ PR RS MS DF
States
Subsidy Policy Indicator (Index)
1995 1998
State Characteristic Bias 
Distance/Tradability











State Characteristic Bias 
Infrastructure/Tradability











State Characteristic Bias 
Subsidy policy/Tax Intensity











State Characteristic Bias  
Subsidy policy/Economies of Scale
















Category Explanatory  variables  Dimension
 Agriculture  abundance      S.T 
  Human capital abundance      S.T 
 Average  manufacturing  wage      S.T 
State Market  potential      S.T 
characteristics Population      S.T 
 Industrial  GDP      S.T 
 Infrastructure      S.T 
  Distance to Buenos Aires      S.. 
 Subsidies      S.T 
     Agriculture  intensity  .IT 
      Human capital intensity  .IT 
     Labor  intensity  .IT 
Industry      Final demand bias  .IT 
characteristics     Industrial  intermediate consumption  .IT 
      Sales to industry  .IT 
      Economies of scale  .IT 
     Trade  intensity  .IT 
     Tax  intensity  .IT 
  Agriculture abundance  * Agriculture intensity  SIT 
  Average manufacturing wage  * Labor intensity  SIT 
  Human capital abundance  * Human capital intensity  SIT 
  Market potential  * Economies of scale  SIT 
Interaction  Population   * Final demand bias  SIT 
terms  Industrial GDP   * Industrial intermediate consumption  SIT 
  Industrial GDP   * Sales to industry  SIT 
  Infrastructure * Trade  intensity  SIT 
  Distance to Buenos Aires  * Trade intensity  SIT 
  Subsidies * Tax  intensity  SIT 
  Subsidies*Market potential  * Tax intensity  SIT 
  Subsidies  * Economies of scale  SIT 
Note:          
S.T: Variables that vary across states and years, but not across industries.   
.IT: Variables that vary across industries and years, but not across states.   
SIT: Variables that vary across states, industries, and years.   




























Agriculture Abundance Agriculture intensity -0.117 -0.117 -0.114
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
Average manufacturing wage Labor intensity -0.398*** -0.337*** -0.400***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.120)
Human capital abundance Human capital intensity 0.394*** 0.402*** 0.411***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Market potential Economies of scale 0.216*** 0.185*** 0.191***
(0.058) (0.060) (0.057)
Population Final demand bias 0.206** 0.229** 0.222**
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Industrial GDP Industrial inputs 0.723*** 0.661*** 0.722***
(0.113) (0.116) (0.114)
Industrial GDP Sales to industry 0.135* 0.254*** 0.136*
(0.075) (0.083) (0.075)
Distance to Buenos Aires Trade intensity -0.514*** -0.536*** -0.528***
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Infrastructure Trade intensity 0.054 0.071 0.046
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
Subsidies Tax intensity 0.453***
(0.134)
Subsidies*Market potential Tax intensity 0.304***
(0.099)




Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the location shares as defined in Equation (8)
Explanatory variables are defined in Table A2.A in Appendix A2
Robust standard error in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Number of Observations
Adjusted R2
Explanatory Variables - Interaction Terms























Agriculture Abundance Agriculture intensity -0.048 -0.048 -0.044
(0.064) (0.065) (0.069)
Average manufacturing wage Labor intensity -0.088 -0.088 -0.089
(0.136) (0.137) (0.136)
Human capital abundance Human capital intensity 0.179 0.182 0.187
(0.138) (0.139) (0.141)
Market potential Economies of scale 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.392***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.070)
Population Final demand bias 0.143 0.148 0.150
(0.107) (0.109) (0.105)
Industrial GDP Industrial inputs 0.598*** 0.584*** 0.594***
(0.164) (0.159) (0.164)
Industrial GDP Sales to industry 0.103 0.127 0.102
(0.081) (0.094) (0.078)
Distance to Buenos Aires Trade intensity -0.320*** -0.322*** -0.329***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.116)
Infrastructure Trade intensity -0.020 -0.020 -0.019
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Subsidies Tax intensity 0.218
(0.161)
Subsidies*Market potential Tax intensity 0.075
(0.163)
Subsidies Economies of scale 0.571***
(0.145)
4860 4860 4860
Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the location shares as defined in Equation (8)
Explanatory variables are defined in Table A2.A in Appendix A2
Panel corrected standard error in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Prais-Winsten Regressions with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors
Explanatory Variables - Interaction Terms























Agriculture Abundance Agriculture intensity 0.526** 0.560** 0.594**
(0.232) (0.230) (0.247)
Average manufacturing wage Labor intensity -0.088 -0.143 -0.169
(0.118) (0.125) (0.129)
Human capital abundance Human capital intensity -0.135 -0.086 -0.145
(0.123) (0.125) (0.109)
Market potential Economies of scale 0.522*** 0.492*** 0.369***
(0.127) (0.117) (0.097)
Population Final demand bias -0.317 -0.401 -0.170
(0.251) (0.269) (0.243)
Industrial GDP Industrial inputs 0.288 0.275 0.313
(0.198) (0.200) (0.193)
Industrial GDP Sales to industry 0.061 0.103 0.146
(0.098) (0.099) (0.104)
Distance to Buenos Aires Trade intensity -0.250* -0.261** -0.244**
(0.131) (0.125) (0.124)
Infrastructure Trade intensity 0.002 -0.039 -0.007
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
Subsidies Tax intensity 0.390*
(0.209)
Subsidies*Market potential Tax intensity 0.095
(0.072)





Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the location shares as defined in Equation (8)
Explanatory variables are defined in Table A2.A in Appendix A2
The Sargan tests are based on the two-step estimations
State characteristics and interactions are treated as endogenous
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Arellano-Bond Estimations (First Step)
Number of Observations
Sargan Test
Test for second order autocorrelation





















1990-1994 1995-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998
lns lns lns lns lns lns
Agriculture Abundance Agriculture intensity -0.028 -0.140** -0.023 -0.140*** -0.002 -0.138**
(0.066) (0.055) (0.067) (0.054) (0.076) (0.058)
Average manufacturing wage Labor intensity -0.078 -0.464** -0.063 -0.467** -0.066 -0.478**
(0.219) (0.211) (0.214) (0.199) (0.215) (0.213)
Human capital abundance Human capital intensity 0.337*** 0.213 0.310** 0.212 0.342*** 0.204
(0.125) (0.152) (0.130) (0.152) (0.128) (0.153)
Market potential Economies of scale 0.454*** 0.182* 0.432*** 0.185* 0.423*** 0.173*
(0.083) (0.099) (0.092) (0.107) (0.075) (0.100)
Population Final demand bias 0.240** 0.072 0.242** 0.080 0.241** 0.077
(0.103) (0.128) (0.116) (0.130) (0.100) (0.131)
Industrial GDP Industrial inputs 0.662*** 0.850*** 0.603*** 0.864*** 0.633*** 0.847***
(0.212) (0.092) (0.193) (0.071) (0.216) (0.091)
Industrial GDP Sales to industry 0.107 0.024 0.218* 0.011 0.102 0.026
(0.107) (0.033) (0.128) (0.089) (0.100) (0.032)
Distance to Buenos Aires Trade intensity -0.279 -0.397*** -0.298 -0.394*** -0.304* -0.403***
(0.184) (0.139) (0.187) (0.137) (0.180) (0.142)
Infrastructure Trade intensity -0.128 0.095** -0.111 0.092** -0.132 0.097**
(0.086) (0.041) (0.085) (0.041) (0.081) (0.043)
Subsidies Tax intensity 0.305 0.156
(0.277) (0.149)
Subsidies*Market potential Tax intensity 0.310* -0.045
(0.163) (0.302)
Subsidies Economies of scale 0.959*** 0.184
(0.152) (0.131)
2700 2160 2700 2160 2700 2160
Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the location shares as defined in Equation (8)
Explanatory variables are defined in Table A2.A in Appendix A2
Panel corrected standard error in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Explanatory Variables - Interaction Terms
Prais-Winsten Regressions with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors
Number of Observations  34
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A w a p =  i=1,2,3. Further, costless trade between regions leads to interregional price equalization, 
A A A A p p p p = = =
3 2 1  and indirectly to interregional wage equalization, w w w w = = =
3 2 1 , as long as the 
agricultural good is produced in each region, which is assumed henceforth.
26 On the other hand, utility 
maximization yields the following demand function for that good: ( ) A A p E C / 1
1 1 µ − = , where the numerator 
indicates the total spending of consumers in region 1 on the agricultural good. The demand of consumers 
in regions 2 and 3 is isomorphic. By Walras’s law this sector’s market clearing condition drops out.  
In the manufacturing sector, due to Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, each firm is atomistic and 
does not therefore take into account the repercussions of its price decision. Furthermore, there is no 
strategic interaction among firms because varieties are differentiated. The individual firm acts thus as a 
monopolist facing a demand curve with constant elasticity of σ . The first-order conditions from the profit 
maximization of a typical firm in region 1 determine the following prices for sales to the local market (p
11) 




















p   (A1.1.)
The price is a constant mark-up of marginal cost. Moreover, it is optimal for firms to resort to mill-
pricing. On the other hand, utility maximization implies that consumers spend 
1 E µ on industrial goods and 





















1 1 1 1 wL K E + =π ; 
1 L  symbolizes region 1’s labor. In the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setting, 
free and instantaneous entry drives pure profits to zero so that E only consists of factor income. 
Isomorphic expressions hold for regions 2 and 3.  
Physical capital is used only in the fixed cost component of industrial production. Hence, the reward 
to capital is the operating profit of a typical variety, which, under the Dixit-Stiglitz assumptions, is the 
value of sales divided byσ . Formally: σ π / px = . Using the demand functions and the price policy of 
firms, the equilibrium expressions for
3 2 1, π π π and (Equation (5) in main text) are derived: 
T
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n n N n N
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π   (A1.4.)
                                                 
26 This non-full-specialization condition requires that no region has enough labor to satisfy the total demand for the agricultural good, 
i.e., that the total expending on this good is larger than the maximum value of its production that is possible in one region.    37
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π   (A1.5.)
Equations (A1.3.-A1.5.) indicate that the reward of the mobile factor, physical capital, hinges upon 
the spatial distribution of industry 
i
n s   (which is taken as exogenous in the short run) and the spatial 
distribution of expenditure,  i
E s . The denominator of  1
E s  is equal to
T T T K wL E π + = . Given the preferences 
functional form and the mill pricing with a constant mark-up, total payment to capital is equal to 
T bE . 
Hence, 












E   (A1.6.)
The numerator of  1
E s  is equal to 





L s  is the share of region 1 in total labor. The second component is determined assuming that 1/3 
of the capital in each region belongs to owners residing in region 1. As a consequence, capital from this 
region earns the average reward. This reward is constant regardless the spatial distribution of industry 
and the degree of openness. As previously seen, total payment to capital is equal to
w bE so that the 
average operating profit per variety equals  T T K bE . Hence,  ( )
T T T
L K E b L ws E + =
1 1 . Dividing by 
w E  and 
using Equation (A1.6): 















L K K s L L s
1 1 1 1 , ≡ ≡ with  3 1
1 1 1 = = = E K L s s s  in the symmetric case. The expenditure share of region 
1 is a weighted average of its endowment shares of total labor and total capital. The weighting factor b is 
increasing in the share of expending that manufacturing goods account for µ  and in the degree of market 
power in industry (as measured by the operating profit margin σ / 1 ).
27  
Some useful standard normalizations are introduced in order to make expressions easier. The 
agricultural good is selected as a numeraire. Furthermore: 
() µ µ σ
δ τ σ
− = − = ⇒ = = = + + ⇒ = ⇒ =
= = ⇒ = = ⇒ − = = = = = = = ⇒ =
b L E s n and n n n n K
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1 1 ; 1 1 1
1 ) / 1 ( 1 ; 1 1
1 1 3 2 1




The solution to the model for the spatial distribution of firms associated with an equalization of rental 











































=   (A1.8.)
The expression for  2
n s  is isomorphic and that of  3
n s  is obtained as  2 1 3 1 n n n s s s − − = . The share of 
manufacturing activity located in region 1 is increasing in the share of expenditure accounted by this 
region:  
                                                 
27 In this model, production spatial shifting does not induce expenditure spatial shifting (changes in sE), as capital’s owners are 
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Appendix A1.C 
Assume that proximity to region 3 differs across regions in the home country, i.e. 2 1 δ δ ≠ . The solution 
to the model with asymmetric locational advantages is given by: 
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φ   (A1.10.)





















R N N N
N N R






















− − + −
−
− =




φ φ φ φ













N . Assume, in particular, that region 1 is located closer to region 3 
than region 2, i.e. 2 1 δ δ 〈 ; more specifically,  1 2
N R N φ φ φ = . Expressions now become: 















































φ   (A1.12.)
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φ φ   (A1.13.)
Forces at work can be more easily seen assuming additionally that regions 2 and 3 are perfectly 
symmetric. In this case, the solution to the model implies that: 






































1   (A1.14.)
Location of firms is driven by two main factors: a home market effect and a geographical effect. The 
home market effect is represented by the second term in the right hand side of Equation (A1.13). If there 
are no size differences (
3 2 1
E E E s s s = = ), this term equals zero. If region 1 is relatively large (
3 2 1
E E E s s s = 〉 ), 
this term is positive as a result of the forces previously explained. Finally, if region 1 is relatively small 
(
3 2 1
E E E s s s = 〈 ), the home market effect is negative. The geographical effect is reflected by the third term in 
the right hand side of Equation (A1.13). The positive sign of this term derives from the fact that, being 
placed at a “central” position, region 1 provides an easy access to other’s region markets. If region 1 is 
relatively large and occupies a “central” position, then both effects reinforce. In turn, if region 1 is 
relatively small, then the effects move in opposite directions. In particular, the locational advantage 
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Appendix A1.D 
Assume that selling locally each industrial output unit involves an intra-regional iceberg trade 
cost
i ρ and that, as before, selling in other region’s market involves interregional trade costsτ and δ . An 
improvement in local infrastructure reflects in a reduction of
i ρ  and an enhancement in interregional   39
(international) infrastructure expresses in a decreases of τ (δ ). Furthermore, suppose that intra-regional 
trade costs differ across regions and it is more costly to trade with an agent located in other region than 
with an agent situated in the same region. In particular,  τ δ ρ ρ ρ < < < <
3 2 1 . The interior solution of the 
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I represents the freeness of intra-regional trade in region i.  
Location depends thus on relative market sizes (as measured by the regional share in total 
expenditure) and on relative infrastructure quality (as measured by the implied intra-regional trade costs). 
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Following Baldwin et al. (2003) input-output linkages are introduced assuming that the production of 
a typical variety requires a unit of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. Thus, the cost function becomes:  












 ≡ ∆ ∆ ≡ ∫
− − −
0
1 1 1 σ σ
µ
µ  is the producer price of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor 
and the bundle of intermediates CM and remaining variables have been previously defined.
28 Equations 
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where both producer price index  p P and consumer price index p are  () σ µ − ∆ = =




3 3 2 2 1 1 1 ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ n N n R n s s s   ()
1
1
1 1 1 1





+ − + =  
                                                 
28 For the sake of simplicity the shares of total expenditures that firms and consumers devote to industrial goods are assumed to be 
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+ − + =  
Notice, first the recursion in the definition of the ∆s which is now the solution of a system of 
equations. These recursions make impossible to get a closed form solution for the location variables
i
n s . 
 
Appendix A1.F 
From equation (A1.12.), the following spatial effect of trade liberalization under asymmetric locational 
advantages can be determined: 






















































∂   (A1.22.)
Assuming additionally that regions 2 and 3 are symmetric in size, this derivative becomes: 
() ()
( )




















































Therefore, reduced international trade costs result in a re-location towards region 1 if the market size 
of this region is not too small. 
 
Appendix A1.G 
It can be shown for the general model that the impact of differentiated infrastructure qualities 
increases as international trade costs decrease if, as usually the case, trade barriers within the country 
are substantially lower than trade barriers with foreign countries.
29 A simpler, more revealing expression 
can be derived assuming a scenario where international trade flows have been completely liberalized, 
i.e.,  R N φ φ = and regions 2 and 3 are perfectly symmetric regarding size and domestic infrastructure, i.e., 
I I I E E and s s φ φ φ = = =
3 2 3 2 . In this case, the solution of the location condition is: 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )
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29 This result can be obtained from the author upon request.   41
Appendix A1.H 
Assume that region 1 concedes a subsidy x proportional to operating profits for firms located in its 
territory. This can be interpreted as a tax break for these firms. The location condition becomes now: 
()
3 2 1 1 π π π = = + x .The solution set for the general model with subsidies contains highly complicated 
expressions which are unrevealing. Therefore, I report the shares of industrial activity in regions 1 and 2 
evaluated at the point where trade has been completely liberalized between the home country and the 
foreign country, i.e.,  R N φ φ = : 
( ) [] ( ) ( )
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=   (A1.27.)
( ) [] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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2 1
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) ( 2 2 2 1 1 ) ( 2 2 1 1
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n
x s
x s s x s
s
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− + − − − +
− + + − − − + − +
=   (A1.28.)
Subsidies induce re-location towards the conceding region: 
( )( )
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φ   (A1.29.)
It can be shown that this derivative is increasing in 
1
E s for intermediate trade costs if 
1











1 1 1 π π π = + = + x x and evaluating the resulting expressions for  1
n s  and  2
n s  at  R N φ φ =  and 
x x x = = 2 1 , the difference between both shares is given by: 
( ) ( ) [ ]( )
() ( ) () () () [] x x s s
s s x x
s s
R E E R R
E E R R
n n + − + + + −
− − − + +
= −
1 1 2 1 1





φ φ   (A1.30.)
which is zero if regions are symmetric in size. Analogously, one can think on fiscal measures 
compensating size differentials. In this sense, assume that smaller regions start to grant tax breaks. As a 
consequence, they may initially experience some locational share gains. Larger regions then react by 
also conceding tax breaks. In order to minimize their revenue losses, they only need to do it in such a 
way that just neutralizes the smaller regions’ policies. This, of course, implies lower subsidies.  
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Intra-state distances () ii d  
Intra-state distance is given by 1/3 of the radius of a circle with the same area as the state i (Leamer, 
1997).  
 
Distance to Buenos Aires (dist) 
Distances between state capitals and Buenos Aires (taken as the main economic centre of 
Argentina) could not be obtained. I estimated these distances using the formula of geodesic distances by 
CEPII. Formally, the distance between two points i and j is given by: 
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where lat is latitude and long means longitude.  
 
Intensity measures and demand biases (agi, lcva, fd, ici, si, trad, ti) 
The data used to calculate the intensity measures have been taken from the National Account 
System of Brazil elaborated by the IBGE. These data do not exactly match the disaggregation used here 
so that I mapped into it. 
The  RAIS Classification includes the following manufacturing sectors: Non-metallic minerals; 
Metallurgy; Mechanics; Electrical and Communication Equipment; Transport Equipment; Wood; Furniture; 
Paper; Printing and Publishing; Rubber; Leather and Hides; Chemicals; Pharmaceuticals; Perfumes, 
Soaps, and Candles; Plastics; Textiles; Clothing and Footwear; Food Products; Beverages; Tobacco; and 
Other Products.  
 
Trade costs – Tradability (trad) 
Usually, models refer to trade costs in a general way, i.e., they are conceived as broad impediments 
to transactions, including man-made barriers (i.e., tariffs). Therefore, I used an indicator of industry output 
tradability as an indicator for the inverse of the foreign trade costs severity for each sector. The evolution 
of this indicator reflects well the opening policy by Brazilian government, both unilaterally and regionally. 
 
Economies of scale (scn) 
Measuring scale economies is problematic. They might be product-specific, plant-specific or due to 
multi-plant operations (Amiti, 1999). Here, following Kim (1995) and Amiti (1999), economies of scale are 
captured by establishment size, i.e., the average number of employees per establishment in the industry 
in question.  
There are other possible measures, like the one developed by Pratten (1988) and extensively used 
by other authors. Pratten ranked industries “in order of the importance of the economies of scales for 
spreading development costs and for production costs”. However, estimations are exclusively based on 
information about developed countries. For that reason the use of Pratten’s measure for a developing 
country such as Brazil can be misleading. 
 
Subsidy policy (sub) 
The variable sub (subsidy policy) amounts to an index of “fiscal aggressiveness” in trying to attract 
firms. A higher value of the index means higher “aggressiveness” in stimulating the location of activities. 
The index sub measures how generous are the incentives provided by the different states in order to 
induce the settlement of industries. I constructed this index by working out the tables on state subsidy 
policies in Piancastelli and Perobelli (1996) and CNI (1998). I took the data in the first publication as 
representative for the first half of the decade and I assumed that the data included in the second 
publication is valid for the remaining period. I normalized the information on diversity of instruments and 
conditions on conceded benefits (percentage of tax reductions, duration, remission period, interest rate, 
and magnitude of foreseen monetary correction) making the average scores equal to 100 and then 
averaged into a summarizing measure. 






















































B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nĳkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de